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Standing at the top of the courthouse steps and telling a litigant who
uses a wheelchair, "You may come in, " is a disingenuous statement of equal
opportunity. Explaining to [a] deaf person that his right to participate in a
trial has been met by virtue of his physical presence in the courtroom when the
proceedings have been conducted in spoken English and without a sign lan-
guage interpreter does not constitute meaningful access to a fundamental
right.1
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) to integrate the disabled population into "all aspects of Ameri-
can life." 2 The ADA drafters strove for equality in "employment op-
portunities, government services, public accommodations,
transportation, and telecommunications." 3 Though it built on prior
civil rights laws, the ADA was unique because it was not merely an
antidiscrimination statute; the ADA required covered entities to take
affirmative steps to accommodate the disabled in certain contexts. In
the employment context, the ADA required employers to make rea-
sonable accommodations for the known physical or mental disabilities
of otherwise qualified employees unless such accommodations would
impose undue hardships. 4 Reasonable accommodations may include,
inter alia, job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, and
reassignment to vacant positions.5
I Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REv. 1043, 1062-63
(2004) (citing Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2003), and Popovich v. Cuyahoga
County Court Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2002)).
2 See George H.W. Bush, U.S. President, Statement on Signing the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 WKLY. COMP. PREs. Doc. 1165, 1165 (July 26, 1990).
3 Id.
4 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102(b) (5) (A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b) (5) (A) (2000).
5 Id. § 101(9) (B).
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As suggested by the opening quote from Professor Laura Rovner,
courts have recognized that physical or communicative accommoda-
tions are needed to protect the rights of disabled individuals.6 Today
most employers provide auxiliary aids and services or modify policies,
practices, and procedures to accommodate disabled employees. 7
However, some employers remain reluctant to reassign employees
who become disabled to vacant positions, and the courts have not yet
uniformly required employers to do so.
On May 30, 2007, the Eighth Circuit decided Huber v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc.,8 holding that the ADA does not require an employer to
reassign a qualified disabled employee to another position when the
employer can fill the vacant position with a more qualified employee.
On July 18, 2007, the Eighth Circuit denied the petition of the em-
ployee, Ms. Huber, to rehear the case en banc. The U.S. Supreme
Court initially granted certiorari in the Huber case, but ultimately dis-
missed the writ after the parties settled the dispute. 9 With the Huber
decision, the Eighth Circuit joined a circuit split: must an employer
reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position when the employee
is not the most qualified applicant? Thus far, the Tenth and D.C. Cir-
cuits have required reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, 10
while the Seventh Circuit has not.1 1
The circuit split over mandatory reassignment revolves largely
around two arguments. The circuits that support mandatory reassign-
ment argue that Congress designed the ADA to compel employers to
make reasonable accommodations for disabled employees, not simply
to consider providing accommodations. 12 If reassignment is optional,
the argument goes, the ADA's reassignment provision lacks any bite.' 3
The circuits that have rejected mandatory reassignment contend that
6 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533 (2004) (arguing that considerations
of cost and convenience cannot justify a failure to provide disabled individuals with mean-
ingful access to the courts).
7 See S. RFP. No. 101-116, at 98 (1989).
8 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc denied, 493 F.3d 1002 (8th Cir.
2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 742 (2007), cert. dismissed, 128 S. Ct. 1116 (2008).
9 See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 742 (2007) (granting certiorari); Hu-
ber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1116 (2008) (dismissing certiorari); Settlement in Wal-
Mart Suit, WAsH. PosT, Jan. 15, 2008, at D2.
10 See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1164-65 (10th Cir. 1999) (en
banc); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1300-01 (D.C. Cir. 1998). But see Huber, 486
F.3d at 483 n.2 (suggesting that Aka did not require mandatory reassignment, but instead
simply rejecting an interpretation of the reassignment provision that only required the
employer to allow the disabled employee to apply alongside other applicants).
11 EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (7th Cir. 2000) (distin-
guishing Aka and stating that Midland Brake is inconsistent with prior Seventh Circuit deci-
sions "that hold that the Americans with Disabilities Act is not a mandatory preference
act").
12 See, e.g., Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1164.
13 See id. at 1164-65.
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the ADA is an antidiscrimination statute, not a mandatory preference
statute. For a court to force employers to reassign disabled employees
to vacant positions, even as a last resort, would constitute "affirmative
action with a vengeance."' 4 Unfortunately, no circuit court has explic-
itly acknowledged that there are different ways to understand the con-
cept of "disability" and that each understanding provides a different
answer to the mandatory reassignment question.
Disability scholars have recognized four primary models or theo-
ries to understand disability. 15 The "moral model" regards disability
as the result of sin. 16 The "medical model" sees disability as a defect
that must be cured.1 7 The "rehabilitation model" is quite similar to
the medical model, holding that society needs to rehabilitate disabled
persons through training and therapy in order to eliminate their indi-
vidual deficiencies.18 Finally, the "socio-political model" situates the
"problem" of disability externally, in stereotypical attitudes and an en-
vironment that fails to meet the needs of the disabled, rather than
within disabled individuals themselves.' 9 Today, the most prominent
models include a hybrid medical-rehabilitative model and the socio-
political model.
This Note provides a new look at the circuit split over the reas-
signment of disabled employees. Part I begins by tracing the develop-
ment of disability law in the United States from colonial times to
present day. This historical account demonstrates the new and trans-
formative nature of the ADA's approach to disability law. Part I then
examines the various disability models, focusing in particular on the
medical-rehabilitative and socio-political models. Part II analyzes the
mandatory reassignment circuit split. First, it discusses the facts be-
hind Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and the district and circuit court
holdings. Part II then discusses all of the circuits' justifications for
and against mandatory reassignment, including arguments based on
the text, legislative history, and policies behind the ADA and its rea-
sonable accommodations provision. Part II concludes by discussing
how the existing circuit split negatively impacts both the business com-
munity and individuals with disabilities.
Part III explains why a socio-political understanding of disability
is appropriate and dictates mandatory reassignment. It first explains
the primacy of the socio-political model and the need to recognize
14 See Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1029.
15 See Deborah Kaplan, The Definition of Disability: Perspective of the Disability Community,
3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 352, 352-54 (2000).
16 See id. at 353.
17 See id. at 352.
18 See id. at 353-54.
19 See id. at 352-53; Rovner, supra note 1, at 1044.
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that social institutions have not been built neutrally. 20 Part III then
discusses how the sharp differences between the ADA and decades of
prior disability law suggest that the ADA drafters adopted the tenets of
the socio-political model. Part III then argues that the ADA, when
viewed through a socio-political lens, demands mandatory reassign-
ment-not as "affirmative action," but as an affirmative step toward
equal employment opportunities for the disabled.
I
BACKGROUND
A. History of Disability Law in the United States
American legal thought on disability has changed markedly over
the last two centuries. Beginning simply as faith-based efforts to help
"the poor," disability law first transformed from a system of charity
into a system of rehabilitation and, finally, to a vehicle for societal
integration. Understanding the development of disability law is essen-
tial to revealing the legal and societal significance of the ADA. Such a
historical understanding should also help inform judicial interpreta-
tions of modern disability law. Thus, a brief history of disability law
follows. 2 1
1. Early Accommodations for the Disabled
The federal government has protected the disabled population
only recently. Early Americans did not consider the hardships faced
by the disabled population to be a significant social problem. 22 The
colonists considered disabled persons to be part of "the poor"-along-
side orphans, the aged, sick, and insane-because financial need was
always the defining characteristic of individuals in need of assis-
tance. 23 Many colonists supported the poor through local, faith-based
efforts, 24 but because the colonists focused on providing financial sup-
20 See Rovner, supra note 1, at 1062 (observing that societal institutions have been
created by a non-disabled majority).
21 For more on the history of disability law in the United States, see I JONATHAN R.
MOOK, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS
§§ 1.03-04 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2003).
22 See DAVIDJ. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER
IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 3-4 (rev. 2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter ROTHMAN, SOCIAL ORDER]; see also
William P. Quigley, Work or Starve: Regulation of the Poor in Colonial America, 31 U.S.F. L. REv.
35, 57 (1996) (" '[I] nsanity was really no different from any other disability; its victim, una-
ble to support himself, took his place as one more among the needy. The lunatic came to
public attention not as someone afflicted with delusions or fears, but as someone suffering
from poverty.'" (quoting DAVID j. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SoCIAL ORDEK
AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 4 (1971))).
23 See ROTHMAN, SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 22, at 4.
24 See id. at 4, 14. Admittedly, it is difficult to generalize about colonial support for
the disabled because the surviving records are sparse and fragmentary. See id. at 30.
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port, persons with physical or mental disabilities still needed to rely
primarily on familial support to accomplish daily-living tasks. 25
Beginning around 1830, American reformers and philanthropists
formulated a revised theory of "charity" that informed social policy
toward disabled persons. 26 Moving beyond mere financial support,
this new theory tried to prevent "all social ailments" 27 through a coop-
erative relationship between private and public charity.28 Because the
state could provide much-needed funds, Dorothea Dix and other so-
cial activists pushed for expanded state support for disabled
individuals.29
Over time, disability policy shifted toward more state-based assis-
tance, but these efforts also proved inadequate. First, legislators were
breaking new ground, and without a firm grasp of the issues, they
drafted statutes with imprecise and incomplete language that proved
unenforceable. 30 A NewJersey charity statute, for example, identified
25 Cf id. at 4. Wealthy disabled Americans received help with daily-living tasks, but
their caretakers often acted with the intent to preserve the disabled individual's property
rather than out of kindness of heart. Marcia Pearce Burgdorf & Robert Burgdorf, Jr., A
History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class"
Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 855, 885 (1975) (citing ALBERT
DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THEIR CARE AND TREATMENT FROM
COLONIAL TIMES 40 (2d ed. 1949)).
26 See ROBERT H. BREMNER, THE PUBLIC GOOD: PHILANTHROPY AND WELFARE IN THE
CIVIL WAR ERA 32-33 (1980).
27 See id. at 33-34. Given the historic focus on financial well-being, it is unsurprising
that many early efforts focused on preventing the social ailment of "poverty." See, e.g.,
William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity: Poor Laws in the Original Thirteen States, 31 U. RICH. L.
REV. 111, 121 (1997) (describing townspeople in Connecticut who "would manage the
affairs of people who looked like they might become poor because of 'idleness, misman-
agement or bad husbandry."' (quoting An Act for Relieving and Ordering of Idiots, Impo-
tent, Distracted and Idle Persons (1784), reprinted in THE FIRST LAws OF THE STATE OF
CONNECTICUT 98, 99 (John D. Cushing ed., 1982))). When it came to "preventing" disabili-
ties, "[e]ugenic propaganda spread with the swiftness of fanaticism." Burgdorf &
Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 887.
28 Cf BREMNER, supra note 26, at xv ("Historically . .. relations [between public and
private activities in the field of welfare], if not always harmonious, have been cooperative
and complementary rather than antagonistic."). Although nineteenth-century Americans
believed private charity to be of higher quality and less demeaning than public charity,
they also recognized the necessity of some public element to coordinate charity efforts. See
id. at xi-xvi; see also Quigley, supra note 27, at 117-18 ("In local responsibility, there was a
public-private partnership on several levels.").
29 See 1 MOOK, supra note 21, § 1.03[1] [a]. Early state support typically involved con-
finement and institutionalization, so by 1830 almost all states encouraged or mandated an
almshouse for the destitute, sick, and insane. See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 25, at
885. Local officials focused on the most expedited way to "deal" with the disabled popula-
tion rather than the interests of the actual people affected, however, so conditions in these
almshouses were very poor. See id. Dorothea Dix fought to bring about a more humane
approach to the treatment of the disabled, and her efforts ultimately fueled the construc-
tion of new facilities nationwide. See id. at 886.
30 See, e.g., ROTHMAN, SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 22, at 4 (stating that New York's first
province-wide legislation "simply charged local officials to 'make provision for the mainte-
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the agent to administer relief to "the poor," but failed to describe who
qualified for relief.3' Second, and more problematic, early state reme-
dies often reinforced prejudicial assumptions about the disabled. For
example, a 1924 Virginia act purported that the state might best pre-
vent mental disability if it sterilized the mentally disabled. 32 In lan-
guage now considered insensitive and even cruel, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the policy:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon
the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not
call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these
lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in
order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is bet-
ter for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate off-
spring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad
enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of
imbeciles are enough.33
Needless to say, such government attitudes did not help address the
needs of the disabled.
The focus of disability policy again shifted once the federal gov-
ernment became involved, this time from a focus on charity to one on
rehabilitation. After World War I, military personnel returned to the
United States with service-connected disabilities, and they faced diffi-
culties adjusting to life at home. 34 In response, Congress passed the
first federal disability law, the Smith-Sears Vocational Rehabilitation
Act of 1918, to fund job training and education for disabled veter-
ans.35 In 1920, Congress enacted a similar rehabilitative program for
disabled civilians.36  Then, in 1932, the election of Franklin D.
Roosevelt solidified the move to a rehabilitation system. Himself se-
nance and support of their poor,' and succeeding acts did not add more explicit
instructions.").
31 Id.
32 See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927) (discussing the constitutionality of a Vir-
ginia statute that prescribed that "the health of the patient and the welfare of society may
be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental defectives").
33 Id. at 207 (citation omitted). For a contemporary twist on the sterilization issue,
see Maura McIntyre, Note, Buck v. Bell and Beyond: A Revised Standard to Evaluate the Best
Interests of the Mentally Disabled in the Sterilization Context, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 1303 (analyzing
the capacity of mentally disabled persons to undergo voluntary sterilization given their
cognitive limitations).
34 See FRANK BowE, HANDICAPPING AMERICA: BARRIERS TO DISABLED PEOPLE 12 (1978).
35 Id.
36 Id.
449
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verely disabled,37 President Roosevelt signed into law the Social Secur-
ity Act, which established, among other things, programs for disabled
children and adults.38 The Social Security Act represented the recog-
nition that "assistance to disabled persons was a matter of social jus-
tice, not charity. '39 In 1954, Congress amended the Act to provide
additional training for the disabled,40 and future federal efforts con-
tinued to focus on rehabilitation.41
2. Civil Rights Era Expanded the Rights of the Disabled
The social movement that defined the concept of civil rights for
African-Americans also expanded the rights of other marginalized
groups. From the 1955 Montgomery bus boycott to the lunch-counter
sit-ins to the 1963 march on Washington, other reformers adopted the
goals and strategies of activists for racial equality in the coming de-
cades. 42 "Civil rights evoked powerful symbols in American political
ideology; the phrase had become linked with cultural and political
values of equality, fair play, and opportunity. ' 43 Disability activists of
the 1960s and early 1970s used the symbols and rhetoric of the Afri-
can-American civil-rights movement to portray access for disabled peo-
ple to societal institutions as a basic civil right.44
Legislators also used the civil-rights framework designed to pro-
tect and benefit African-Americans as a model to protect other subor-
dinated groups.45 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited
discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in programs
receiving federal funds. 46 Congress adopted Title VI because of the
37 Id. at 12-13 ("Roosevelt was severely disabled yet that is not what the American
public saw. Instead, it witnessed an able, confident, assertive, and, above all, active, individ-
ual leading the country into new and exciting prosperity.").
38 Id. at 13.
39 Id; see Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935), available
at http://www.ssa.gov/history/35actinx.html.
40 See Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-565, §§ 2-5, 68
Stat. 652, 652-58 (1954) (repealed 1973) (providing grants to states for vocational rehabili-
tative services).
41 See EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, DISABLED POLICY. AMERICA'S PROGRAMS FOR THE HANDI-
CAPPED 47 (1987) (noting growing support for rehabilitation by policymakers after World
War II).
42 See RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL
DISABILITY POLICY 24 (1984). For example, the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund served as a
model for promoting individual rights through the judicial system, and other activist move-
ments emulated the civil disobedience tactics of the racial equality movement. See id. at 25.
43 Id. at 41.
44 See id.
45 See id. at 25 (discussing several civil rights laws enacted in order to end discrimina-
tion against African-Americans that later served as models to protect other groups).
46 See id. at 26 ("'No person in the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assis-
tance.'" (quoting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Star. 252)).
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inconsistency of pursuing a federal policy of nondiscrimination while
simultaneously funding entities that discriminated. 47 After its adop-
tion, Title VI served as a model for legislative efforts banning discrimi-
nation against women. 48 By the early 1970s, Congress began to accept
that disabled people also had a right to social and economic participa-
tion.49 Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to "promote
and expand employment opportunities in the public and private sec-
tors for handicapped individuals and to place such individuals in em-
ployment, '50 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act closely tracked
the civil rights guarantees of Title VI.5 1
Though legislators used Title VI as a model-or perhaps exactly
because Congress grafted a civil-rights framework onto federal disabil-
ity law-it was unclear how the federal government would implement
section 504.52 The Rehabilitation Act did not describe how or when
discrimination on the basis of handicap was to be eliminated, or what
constituted illegal discrimination. 53 Even after the Office of Civil
Rights implemented enforcement regulations, disability law remained
plagued with complexities, inconsistencies, and fragmentation. 54
Many disabled Americans who needed public assistance did not re-
ceive it. According to the 1980 Census, approximately two-thirds of
disabled persons were not receiving Social Security Disability Insur-
ance (SSDI), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), or any other form
of public assistance. 5 5
47 See id.
48 See id. at 27 (noting that Tide VI served as a model for Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 protecting the rights of women).
49 See id. at 43 (noting that on January 20, 1972, Senator Hubert Humphrey proposed
amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to ban discrimination on the basis of physical or
mental handicap in federally assisted programs).
50 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 2(8), 87 Stat. 355, 357.
51 See SCOTCH, supra note 42, at 58 (explaining the role of Title VI as a model for
section 504); see also Mark F. Engebretson, Note, Administrative Action to End Discrimination
Based on Handicap: HEW's Section 504 Regulation, 16 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 59, 89 (1979) (not-
ing that the Office of Civil Rights modeled its forthcoming enforcement regulations after
prior civil rights provisions). Interestingly, Scotch suggests that members of Congress were
generally not aware that the Rehabilitation Act included a section modeled after Tide VI.
SCOTCH, supra note 42, at 58. Apparently, there was little debate because no one could
argue against a general statement that recipients of federal funds should not discriminate.
See id. at 57-59.
52 See SCOTCH, supra note 42, at 60.
53 See id. ("Conceivably, Section 504 could have remained a simple statement of good
intentions.").
54 See NAT'L COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: AN ASSESSMENT
OF FEDERAL LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES-WITH LEGISLATIVE
RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (1986). President Reagan described the law as "patchwork quilt of
existing policies and programs." Id. (quoting Ronald Reagan, U.S. President, Remarks on
Signing Proclamation 5131, Establishing the National Decade of Disabled Persons, 19
WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc.1620 (Nov. 28, 1983)).
55 Id. at 11-12.
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The need for comprehensive reform was apparent. Studies
demonstrated that then-existing federal disability programs were not
structured or administered in ways that would encourage and assist
private-sector efforts to promote opportunities and independence for
disabled persons.56 The demand for federal disability law reform
came from many sources: a new class-consciousness among the dis-
abled; an increasing number of disabled persons; and a belief that
satisfying the needs of disabled employees and customers would cre-
ate new business opportunities.57 Marking another shift in disability
policy, in 1990 Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act,58
and President George H.W. Bush signed it into law. 59
3. Modern Disability Law: The ADA and Reasonable
Accommodations
Congress designed the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) to "open up all aspects of American life" to disabled persons. 60
President Bush recognized that then-existing federal disability law
failed to address the wide-ranging barriers faced by the disabled popu-
lation.61 Moving away from a focus on rehabilitating the disabled pop-
ulation, lawmakers designed the ADA to integrate disabled individuals
into society, striving for equality in employment opportunities, gov-
ernment services, public accommodations, transportation, and
telecommunications. 62
The ADA was, and still is, distinct from antidiscrimination laws,
because the ADA not only bars discrimination but also requires affirm-
ative steps in certain contexts. Many antidiscrimination laws are based
on the idea that prohibiting decisions because of certain personal
characteristics- skin color, sex, age, etc.-will provide minorities with
equal opportunities. 63 The ADA takes a different approach, holding
that equal opportunity for the disabled community sometimes re-
quires both neutral decision making and affirmative efforts by the
56 See id. at 12-14.
57 SeeJoseph P. Shapiro, Liberation Day for the Disabled, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept.
18, 1989, at 20, 21-22. Furthermore, "no one wanted to look like a bigot fighting a civil-
rights bill, particularly one that was rushing through Congress." Id. at 21.
58 See 136 CONG. REc. H4629 (daily ed. July 12, 1990); 136 CONG. REC. S9695 (daily
ed. July 13, 1990).
59 See George H.W. Bush, U.S. President, Statement on Signing the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 WKv. CoMp. PREs. Doc. 1165 (July 26, 1990).
60 See id.
61 See id. (noting that existing laws "have left broad areas of American life untouched
or inadequately addressed").
62 See id.
63 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 101-116, at 98 (1989) ("In order to provide equal treatment to
racial minorities, a business need only disregard race and judge a person on his or her
merits.").
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nondisabled community. 64 This is because obstacles that at first
glance appear neutral may not be neutral for disabled persons. 6 5 In
the employment context, for example, a disabled person faces at least
two primary barriers to full participation. 66 First, the disabled person
needs the employer to look beyond their disability in the hiring deci-
sion; the neutral decision-making principles behind antidiscrimina-
tion law generally protect the disabled in this context. Second, the
disabled person needs to be able to succeed once on the job, and this
could be problematic if the workplace is not consistent with the capa-
bilities of the disabled employee. An employee in a wheelchair might
not be able to attend a corporate meeting held in a building without
an elevator, for example. The ADA recognizes this second barrier to
full participation and requires certain accommodations like auxiliary
aids and services. 67
More specifically, the ADA requires employers to make reasona-
ble accommodations to the known physical or mental disabilities of
otherwise qualified employees unless the accommodations would im-
pose undue hardships. 68 The concept of "reasonable accommoda-
tion" is central to the ADA69 and constitutes the primary affirmative
responsibility of employers:
The duty to provide reasonable accommodation is a fundamental
statutory requirement because of the nature of discrimination faced
by individuals with disabilities. Although many individuals with disa-
bilities can apply for and perform jobs without any reasonable ac-
commodations, there are workplace barriers that keep others from
performing jobs which they could do with some form of accommo-
dation. These barriers may be physical obstacles.., or they may be
64 See, e.g., id. ("To provide equal opportunity for a person with a disability will some-
times require additional actions and costs than those required to provide access to a per-
son without a disability."); see also discussion infra Part II.B.1.
65 See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL
ABILITIES 99-100 (1983) (arguing that providing equal opportunities may not be sufficient
to allow individuals with disabilities to participate in the workforce).
66 Access to full employment opportunities means more than earning money; in
American society, work has become a form of social identity and a source of happiness. See
Timothy M. Cook, Note, Nondiscrimination in Employment Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
27 AM. U. L. REV. 31, 37 n.36 (1977) (citing GEORGES FRIEDMANN, THE ANATOMY OF WORK
122-28 (Wyatt Rawson trans., Transaction Publishers 1992) (1961)).
67 See S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 98 (1989).
68 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112 (b) (5) (A) (2000).
69 See Sandy Andrikopoulos & Theo E.M. Gould, Note, Living In Harmony? Reasonable
Accommodations, Employee Expectations and US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 345, 350-51 (2003) ("One of the ADA's primary vehicles for integrating disabled
employees into society is by furnishing them with reasonable accommodations.").
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procedures or rules . . . . Reasonable accommodation removes
workplace barriers for individuals with disabilities. 70
Despite its importance, the definition of the term "reasonable ac-
commodation" is elusive. The ADA does not explicitly define the
term "reasonable accommodation"; instead, it provides a series of ex-
amples of acceptable accommodations. 7 1 According to the ADA, rea-
sonable accommodations include job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, and reassignment to vacant positions. 72 Re-
gardless of the particular accommodation, the goal is to assist the dis-
abled in obtaining equal employment opportunities. 7 3 Reassignment,
for example, cannot be a ruse for a demotion; employers reassigning
disabled employees must select vacant positions with equivalent pay
and status.74 These requirements are consistent with the ADA's focus
on modifying the working environment to meet the needs of disabled
individuals. 75
B. Disability Models
Disability scholars recognize four primary models for understand-
ing disability: the "moral model," "medical model," "rehabilitation
model," and "socio-political model. ' 76 The moral model is the oldest
of the four, and it regards disability as the result of sin. 77 Though not
prevalent today, some cultures still embrace the moral model, choos-
ing to associate disability with guilt that in turn brings shame on the
family.78 The medical model regards disability as a defect that medi-
cal intervention must cure.7 9 It arose alongside the development of
modern medicine in the nineteenth century. 0 The rehabilitation
model is similar to the medical model, and it holds that a disabled
person needs to be rehabilitated with training, therapy, or counseling
70 EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARD-
SHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/accommodation.html.
71 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 101 (9).
72 Id. § 101(9)(B).
73 See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2008) (describing "reasonable accommoda-
tions" required under the ADA).
74 EEOC, supra note 70.
75 Cf. U.S. COMM'N ON CIL RIGHTS, supra note 65, at 102 ("Discrimination against
handicapped people cannot be eliminated if programs, activities, and tasks are always
structured in the ways people with 'normal' physical and mental abilities customarily un-
dertake them. Adjustments or modifications of opportunities to permit handicapped peo-
ple to participate fully have been broadly termed 'reasonable accommodation."').
76 See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 352-53.
77 See id. at 353.
78 See id.
79 See id. at 352.
80 See id. at 353.
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to compensate for the deficiencies caused by the disability.8 ' Finally,
the socio-political model, also known as the "disability model," exter-
nalizes the "problem" of disability in negative stereotypes and environ-
mental obstacles. 82 Today, the most common models include a
hybrid of the medical and rehabilitative models, and the socio-politi-
cal model.
1. Medical-Rehabilitative Model
The medical model of disability proffers the medical profession
as the rescuer of the disabled population. Under the medical model,
the difficulties experienced by a disabled person reside within that
individual, and the individual must await a "cure."83 The disabled
population is sick, and society should excuse the sick population from
normal societal obligations like attending school or working a job. 84
Under the medical model, society has no obligation to accommodate
the unique needs of disabled persons because they "live in an outsider
role waiting to be cured."85
The rehabilitation model is essentially a modern application of
the medical model. Like the medical model, the rehabilitation model
locates the difficulties faced by a disabled person within the disabled
individual-rehabilitation is needed to cure the individual's defects.
The idea that disabled individuals need training and therapy gained
acceptance when disabled veterans began to return from the World
Wars and needed help readjusting to life at home. 86 One can see the
modern influence of the rehabilitation model in the Vocational Reha-
bilitation system,8 7 which currently provides services to disabled indi-
viduals so that they may obtain and maintain gainful employment.8 8
2. Socio-Political Model
The socio-political model regards disability as an ordinary aspect
of life. Some individuals have physical or mental impairments while
81 See id. at 353-54.
82 See id. at 352-53. Stereotypes often create the improper perception that disabled
persons cannot offer meaningful contributions to the community through social interac-
tion. Cook, supra note 66, at 33-34.
83 See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 353.
84 See id. at 353-54. To some extent, this view exists today. For example, the Social
Security system defines "disability" as the inability to work. See id. at 354 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1) (1994)).
85 Id. at 353.
86 See BowE, supra note 34, at 12 (World War I); Kaplan, supra note 15, at 354-55
(World War II).
87 See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 355.
88 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO REPORT No. 05-865, VOCATIONAL RE-
HABILITATION: BETTER MEASURES AND MONITORING COULD IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF
THE VR PROGRAM 1, 7 (2005).
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others do not; individuals who have such impairments struggle at cer-
tain tasks, not because of personal defects, but because society has
failed to design physical and social structures consistent with their ca-
pabilities. The underlying problem lies in a society that provides inad-
equate support services to the disabled and imposes "attitudinal,
architectural, sensory, cognitive, and economic barriers" to full socie-
tal participation. 9 Under the socio-political model, to situate the
"problem" of disability within disabled individuals themselves is to per-
petuate social discrimination. 90
Under the socio-political model, disability is a social construct.
The model holds that there is no static concept of "normal." For
some, the "normal" way to travel a mile is to walk; for others, it is to
use a wheelchair; and for others, it is to use a bike, bus, or taxi. 91 In
all cases, what is "normal" for an individual depends on the individ-
ual's environment. To think in terms of the "disabled" and the "ex-
tremely capable" as bipolar opposites distorts reality:
If you imagine "the disabled" at one end of a spectrum and people
who are extremely physically and mentally capable at the other, the
distinction appears to be clear. However, there is a tremendous
amount of middle ground in this construct, and it is in the middle
that the scheme falls apart. What distinguishes a socially "invisible"
impairment-such as the need for corrective eyeglasses-from a
less acceptable one-such as the need for a corrective hearing aid,
or the need for a walker? Functionally, there may be little differ-
ence. Socially, some impairments create great disadvantage or so-
cial stigma for the individual, while others do not. Some are
considered disabilities, and some are not.92
According to the socio-political model, once one understands the so-
cial forces behind the concept of "disability," one can begin to under-
stand how existing disability policies perpetuate confinement and
institutionalization rather than societal integration.93
89 See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 352-53.
90 See id. at 355.
91 See id. (quoting David Pfeiffer, The Disability Paradigm and Federal Policy Relating
to Children with Disabilities 6 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with TheJournal of
Health Care Law & Policy)).
92 Id. at 356-57.
93 See id. at 355.
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II
HUBER V. WAL-MART STORES, INC.: EIGHTH CIRCUIT JOINS A
CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Decision
1. Facts
Pam Huber worked for Wal-Mart as a dry grocery order filler and
earned $13.00 per hour.94 While working for Wal-Mart, Huber sus-
tained a permanent injury to her right arm and hand, which pre-
vented her from performing the essential functions of the order-filler
job.95 As a result of her disability, Huber asked Wal-Mart to reassign
her to a router position as a reasonable accommodation under the
ADA.96 Wal-Mart refused to automatically reassign Huber to the posi-
tion,97 though the company stipulated that the router position was
both vacant and equivalent to the order-filler position. 98
Rather than immediately reassigning Huber, Wal-Mart told her
that she must apply and compete for the router position just like any
other applicant. 99 Wal-Mart stated that its reassignment decision was
consistent with its policy of hiring the most qualified applicant for any
position.1 00 Wal-Mart found that Huber was qualified to perform the
duties of the new job but "was not the most qualified candidate," so
the company ultimately denied her the position. 10 1 Wal-Mart then
placed Huber at a different facility in a janitorial position that paid
$6.20 per hour. 0 2 Huber filed suit against Wal-Mart, alleging that the
ADA compelled Wal-Mart to reassign her to the router position as a
reasonable accommodation for her disability.' 0 3
2. District Court Holds for Huber
Both Wal-Mart and Huber moved for summary judgment in the
district court, agreeing that the dispositive question was an issue of
law: Under the ADA, must an employer reassign to a vacant position a
qualified disabled employee when she is not the most qualified candi-
94 Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 481 (8th Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc
denied, 493 F.3d 1002 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 742 (2007), cert. dismissed, 128
S. Ct. 1116 (2008).
95 Id.
96 Id. Huber and Wal-Mart stipulated that Huber's injury is a disability under the
ADA. Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
too Id.
101 Id. The parties stipulated that Wal-Mart hired the most qualified candidate. Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 482.
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date? 0 4 The court began its analysis by reviewing the ADA's ban on
employment discrimination on the basis of disability,10 5 and then the
court reviewed the ADA's reasonable accommodation rule:
discrimination occurs if a covered entity [does] not . . . make rea-
sonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limita-
tions of an otherwise qualified applicant or employee with a
disability, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the ac-
commodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation
of its business. 10 6
The court then acknowledged the existence of a circuit split on the
issue of mandatory reassignment. 0 7 Without binding precedent on
point, the court proceeded to conduct its own analysis.
The district court held that a prior U.S. Supreme Court decision
addressing reasonable accommodations did not resolve the issue. 10 8
In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the Supreme Court held that an em-
ployer need not reassign a disabled employee if doing so would con-
flict with seniority rules in place at the company. 109 According to the
district court, Barnett did not create a per se rule against mandatory
reassignment, however, because Barnett allowed any plaintiff to pre-
sent evidence showing that reassignment, as an exception to a senior-
ity rule, was appropriate.' 10 The district court distinguished an
employer's policy of hiring the most qualified candidate from work-
place seniority rules, finding that the special benefits of a seniority
system, like encouraging employees to invest their time and effort in
the employing company, do not apply to a merit-based reassignment
policy like the one Wal-Mart used."'
The district court then held that the ADA requires mandatory
reassignment. 112 First, the district court read Barnett to mean an ac-
commodation may be reasonable (and therefore required under the
ADA) even if it exempts a disabled employee from a company policy
that other employees must follow. t 1 3 The court derived this rationale
104 Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 04-2145, 2005 WL 3690679, at *1 (W.D. Ark.
Dec. 7, 2005).
105 Id. at *2 (noting that the ADA prohibits an employer from discrimination "'against
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard
to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, em-
ployee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment"' (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a))).
106 Id. at *3 (quoting Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal
quotations omitted, alterations in original)).
107 Id. The arguments on both sides of the circuit split are discussed infra Part II.B.
108 Id. at *4.
109 535 U.S. 391, 406 (2002).
11o Huber, 2005 WL 3690679, at *4.
M 1 Id. at *4-5.
112 Id. at *5.
113 Id.
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from the ability of a disabled employee to present evidence of extenu-
ating circumstances in order to create an exception to an employer's
seniority rules. Second, the district court adopted the reasoning of
the Tenth and D.C. Circuits'1 4 and held that, when reassignment is
reasonable, employers may not require qualified disabled employees
to compete for vacant positions. 1 5
3. Eighth Circuit Holds for Wal-Mart
The Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo the district court's grant of
summary judgment for Huber.1 1 6 First, the court confirmed that the
legal dispute centered on whether the ADA requires an employer, as a
reasonable accommodation, to fill a vacant position with a current dis-
abled employee when the disabled employee is not the most qualified
candidate. 1 7 Then the court reviewed the circuit court split. 18
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court and held for Wal-
Mart. It adopted the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit t 19 and held
that requiring reassignment would convert the ADA, a nondiscrimina-
tion statute, into a "'mandatory preference statute."' 1 20 According to
the Eighth Circuit, employment decisions on the merits are not dis-
criminatory, and to conclude otherwise would be "'affirmative action
with a vengeance."'1 21 The court rejected any attempt to award ajob
on the basis of disability or any other statutorily protected status.' 2 2
B. Eighth Circuit Joins Split on "Reasonable Accommodation"
The circuit courts have disagreed over whether the ADA requires
mandatory reassignment as a reasonable accommodation to disabled
employees who cannot otherwise serve in their prior positions.1 2 3 In
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc.,1 2 4 the Tenth Circuit required reassign-
ment. A year prior, the D.C. Circuit had reached the same conclu-
1 14 See id. at *5-6. For a summary of the reasoning of the Tenth and D.C. Circuits, see
infta Part II.B.1.
115 Id. The district court did not determine whether mandatory reassignment would
impose an undue hardship on the employer because the parties stipulated that it would
not. Id. at *7.
116 Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 482 (8th Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc
denied, 493 F.3d 1002 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 742 (2007), cert. dismissed, 128
S. Ct. 1116 (2008).
117 Id. at 482.
118 Id. at 482-83.
119 Id. at 483. For a summary of the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, see infra Part
II.B.2.
.20 Id. (quoting EEOC v. Huriiitoh-Keeing, Inc., 1 1024 l 7t, Cir. ,-0001i.
121 Id. at 483-84 (quoting Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1029).
122 Id. at 484.
123 See infta Part II.B.
124 180 F.3d 1154, 1164-65 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
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sion. 25 The Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in
EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc.126 As discussed above, the Eighth Cir-
cuit adopted the Seventh Circuit's reasoning and did not require reas-
signment in Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc.1 27 Other circuits have not
addressed the reassignment issue in any depth.
1 28
Circuit courts that have addressed the mandatory reassignment
issue have typically adopted at least part of the rationale of another
circuit and then provided unique justifications for their holdings.
The primary justifications relate to the text, legislative history, and
policy behind the ADA's reasonable accommodations provision. This
Note will now examine each justification offered for or against
mandatory reassignment.
1. Circuit Justifications for Mandatory Reassignment
a. Textual
The ADA prohibits, among other things, employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability. An employer must make reasonable
accommodations to the known physical and mental limitations of oth-
erwise qualified disabled employees unless the employer can demon-
strate that an accommodation would impose undue hardship on the
business. 129 According to the ADA, "reasonable accommodations" in
the employment context may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reas-
signment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equip-
ment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of quali-
fied readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.
1 30
125 See Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1304-06 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
But see Huber, 486 F.3d at 483 n.2 (suggesting that Aka is a more limited holding).
126 227 F.3d at 1027-29.
127 486 F.3d at 483-84.
128 The Fifth Circuit has suggested that it would not require reassignment, at least
when reassignment would violate an established seniority program. See Daugherty v. City of
El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[W]e do not read the ADA as requiring affirma-
tive action in favor of individuals with disabilities, in the sense of requiring that disabled
persons be given priority in hiring or reassignment over those who are not disabled.").
The Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have cited the Fifth Circuit's Daugherty decision
with approval. See, e.g., Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 457, 459 (6th Cir.
2004); Terrell v. USAir, 132 F.3d 621, 627 (11th Cir. 1998); Wernick v. Fed. Reserve Bank
of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379, 384-85 (2d Cir. 1996).
129 See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1300 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A) (1994)).
130 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (9) (2000) (em-
phasis added).
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Some circuit courts have interpreted the ADA's list of reasonable ac-
commodations to mean that an employer must reassign a qualified
disabled employee to a vacant position, at least when no other accom-
modations are appropriate or reasonable.
A common argument supporting "mandatory" reassignment is
that the word "reassignment" must mean more than simply allowing
an employee to apply for a job on the same terms as other appli-
cants. 13 1 These textualists argue that the core word "assign" in "reas-
signment" implies active effort on the part of the employer; after all,
employees who on their own apply for and obtain other jobs some-
where else in the company have not been "reassigned." 13 2 Further-
more, according to these textualists, the ADA's reassignment
provision would be redundant if it meant only that employers may not
prevent disabled employees from applying for other positions-the
ADA already bans discrimination on the basis of disability in regard to
job application procedures. 13 3 Finally, the ADA defines the term "rea-
sonable accommodation" to include "reassignment to a vacant posi-
tion," not simply "consideration" of reassignment to a vacant
position.134 To suggest that reassignment is optional would mean that
the statutory phrase "reasonable accommodation" is mere
"surplusage."135
Some circuits argue that reassignment must be mandatory be-
cause the text of the ADA does not denigrate the reassignment accom-
modation relative to other accommodations. The ADA lists several
reasonable accommodations-job restructuring, part-time or modi-
fied work schedules, and modified equipment-alongside reassign-
ment, 136 yet nothing in the text transforms reassignment into a lesser
accommodation. 13 7 Following this logic, because an employer must
not only consider but must implement the other accommodations, an
employer must also reassign a qualified disabled employee.' 3 8
131 See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304.
132 See id.
133 See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)).
134 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 101(9); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc.,
180 F.3d 1154, 1164 (10th Cir. 1999). Some critics argue that the phrase "'may include
reassignment to a vacant position' cannot mean 'shall include reassignment to a vacant
position."' Smith, 108 F.3d at 1184 (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The response is that the words "may include" precede the list of examples of reasonable
accommodation because the list is nonexclusive and accommodations may not be appro-
priate depending upon the disability, but the phrase does not mean that the accommoda-
tions are optional. Id. at 1168 n.7 (majority opinion).
135 See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304 (citing Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140 (1994)).
136 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 10110) (1,).
137 See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1167.
138 Cf id. ("There is nothing about a reassignment that transforms it into a lesser ac-
commodation than the others listed, which an employer must not only consider but must
also implement if appropriate.... We conclude that reassignment of an employee to a
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Another justification for mandatory reassignment is that a con-
trary ruling constitutes ajudicial amendment of the statute. The ADA
says: "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individ-
ual with a disability."' 39 According to proponents of mandatory reas-
signment, if a court permits a merit-based policy to trump the ADA's
reassignment provision, then that court (at least implicitly) judicially
amends the statutory phrase "'qualified individual with a disability' to
read, instead, 'best qualified individual, notwithstanding the disabil-
ity."" 40 Courts should avoid such amendments because they owe a
duty to enforce the ADA as Congress wrote it;t 4 1 moreover, one
amendment would arguably compel courts to amend the require-
ments of other reasonable accommodations, 42 creating absurd re-
sults. For example, a court that permits a merit-based policy to trump
reassignment would also need to allow employers to replace with
"more qualified" employees those disabled employees who ask for
other workplace accommodations, such as modified work
schedules. 143
Finally, circuits that have required reassignment contend that the
judiciary should be loathe to stray from the text of the ADA because
Congress already created sufficient "safeguards" to protect employers
from too much interference with their business operations. First, an
employer need only reassign an employee to an existing vacantjob; an
employer need not create vacancies. 144 Second, the disabled em-
ployee must still be qualified 45 for the vacant position. 146 Third, the
reassignment need not involve a promotion, and the employer has the
flexibility to choose which appropriate vacant job to offer the em-
ployee. 147 Finally, an employer does not have to make an accommo-
dation like reassignment if it would impose an undue hardship on the
employer's business.148 Circuits requiring reassignment believe that if
vacant position in a company is one of the range of reasonable accommodations which
must be considered and, if appropriate, offered if the employee is unable to perform his or
her existing job.").
139 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102(a).
140 See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1167-68.
141 Cf id. (analyzing the "Findings and Purposes" of the ADA alongside the ADA's
legislative history in order to understand congressional intent).
142 See id. at 1167 n.6.
143 See id.
144 See id. at 1170.
145 An employee is "qualified" if she, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the job. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
§ 101(8), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
146 See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1170.
147 See id.
148 Seid
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further limitations are necessary, they must come from Congress, not
the judiciary. 149
b. Legislative History
Proponents of mandatory reassignment concede that Congress
expected reassignment to be an employer's last resort, but these pro-
ponents also argue that the reassignment provision was not designed
to be optional. According to the House Committee on Education and
Labor report on the ADA, an employer should try to accommodate a
disabled employee in his original position before considering reas-
signment.150 But if an employer cannot accommodate the employee
in the original position, the employer should transfer the employee to
another vacant job to prevent the employee from being out of work
and the employer from losing a valuable worker. 15 ' Examining the
legislative reports, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) concluded that the ADA requires reassignment:
Does reassignment mean that the employee is permitted to com-
pete for a vacant position?
No. Reassignment means that the employee gets the vacant posi-
tion if s/he is qualified for it. Otherwise, reassignment would be of
little value and would not be implemented as Congress intended.15 2
Though not controlling, proponents of mandatory reassignment ar-
gue that the EEOC guidelines should aid courts' understanding of
congressional intent.' 53
149 See id.
150 SeeAka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (quot-
ing H.R. REP. No. 101-485(II), at 63 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 345); see
also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989) (describing the nature and extent of discrimination
on the basis of disability).
151 See id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 63 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 345).
152 EEOC, supra note 70, 29; see Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 498 (7th
Cir. 1996) ("Our review of the ADA, its regulations, and the EEOC's interpretive guidance
leads us to the conclusion of the majority of courts that have addressed the issue that the
ADA may require an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a different position as
reasonable accommodation where the employee can no longer perform the essential func-
tions of their current position.").
153 See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1301 (stating that the ADA's legislative history supports the
EEOC guidelines and that courts may look to the EEOC guidelines for guidance (citing
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986))). Though no circuit court has yet had
an opportunity to apply Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007), to the
EEOC's interpretation of the ADA reasonable accommodations provision, some believe
that Long Island Care requires courts to afford additional deference to the interpretation of
an agency like the EEOC. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9-11, Huber v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 742 (No. 07-480) (2007), cert. dismissed, 128 S. Ct. 1116 (2008)
("Long Island Care... emphasized that 'an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is
controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations being inter-
preted.' . . . The Eighth Circuit [in Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir.
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Circuit courts requiring reassignment have dismissed concerns
that their holdings mandate preferential treatment because, these
courts contend, Congress understood that "special" or "preferential"
treatment is sometimes necessary to achieve its goal of prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of disability. 154 First, though the ADA's legis-
lative history warns against "preferences" for disabled applicants in
hiring decisions,'155 it also indicates that the ban on preferences does
not cover reasonable accommodations for existing employees who be-
come disabled.156 Second, proponents of mandatory reassignment ar-
gue that Congress would not have included other safeguards for
employers had it intended for employers to treat disabled employees
exactly like other job applicants. 157 Without a mandatory reassign-
ment scheme, Congress would not have needed to explain that em-
ployers need not "bump" another employee to create vacancy, nor
would it have needed to explain that employers may consider collec-
tive bargaining agreements in determining whether it is reasonable to
assign a disabled employee without seniority to the job. 158 Thus, if
Congress understood that some ADA provisions might create "prefer-
ences" for disabled persons and Congress nevertheless enacted the
provisions, courts should vigorously enforce them.
Finally, the ADA itself arguably supports mandatory reassignment
because its own provisions state that the ADA should not be construed
to afford lesser protection than afforded under Title V of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 or its accompanying regulations.1 5 9 Significantly,
the Justice Department regulations under the Rehabilitation Act re-
quired reasonable accommodation: "A recipient shall make reasona-
ble accommodation to . . . an otherwise qualified handicapped
applicant or employee unless the recipient can demonstrate . . .an
undue hardship .... ,,1160 Proponents of mandatory reassignment con-
2007)] not only disregarded the statutory text but also entirely ignored the EEOC's inter-
pretation of the Commission's own 'reasonable accommodation' regulations.. . ." (cita-
tion omitted)). But see Wal-Mart's Brief in Opposition at 11-13, Huber, 128 S. Ct. 742 (No.
07-480) (distinguishing EEOC guidance from the Department of Labor's formal position
in Long Island Care, which the Court found to be part of a formally adopted federal regula-
tion, including notice and public comments).
154 See Andrikopoulos & Gould, supra note 69, at 350.
155 H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 56 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 338.
156 SeeAka, 156 F.3d at 1304 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 63 (1990), as reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345).
157 See id.
158 See id.
159 See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1165 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 12201 (a)). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that section 501 of the ADA, 42
U.S.C. §12201 (a), requires courts to "construe the ADA to grant at least as much protec-
tion as provided by the regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act." Bragdon v. Ab-
bott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998).
160 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 (2008) (emphasis added).
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tend that if employers need only consider a disabled employee for a
vacant position, the ADA would provide less protection than that af-
forded by the regulations of the Rehabilitation Act. '6 '
c. Policy
Some circuits have held that mandatory reassignment is the only
way to prevent employers from completely circumventing the reasona-
ble accommodations provision of the ADA. According to this argu-
ment, the ADA would lose its bite if employers could avoid it simply by
adopting a merit-based policy similar to the one adopted by Wal-
Mart.162 Employers would need only go through the illusory process
of considering a disabled employee's application and then denying it
in every instance. "It would be cold comfort for a disabled employee
to know that his or her application was 'considered' but that he or she
was nevertheless still out of a job ....
Circuit courts requiring reassignment reject claims that they have
mandated "affirmative action." Not only did Congress implement
safeguards for employers,1 64 but also the ADA reasonable accommo-
dation requirement itself inherently treats disabled persons differently
than the rest of the population; for example, an employer need not
agree to part-time or modified work schedules for non-disabled em-
ployees. 165 If Congress believed disparate treatment was necessary to
achieve equality for the disabled, courts have no authority to question
thatjudgment. Congress chose to include reassignment in the defini-
tion of "reasonable accommodation," so courts should simply enforce
the reasonable accommodation provision by requiring employers to
reassign disabled employees.166
2. Circuit Justifications Against Mandatory Reassignment
a. Textual
Those circuit courts that rejected mandatory reassignment found
support for their holdings in the text of the ADA's reasonable accom-
modation provision. 1 67 According to these circuits, had Congress in-
tended to grant a preference to the disabled population, Congress
would have clearly said so. 1 68 Instead, the statute simply states that
161 See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1165 n.4.
162 Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 04-2145, 2005 WL 3690679, at *7 (W.D. Ark.
Dec. 7, 2005).
163 Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1167.
164 See supra Part II.B.1.a.
165 See Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1305 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
166 See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1167.
167 For the language of the provision, see supra text accompanying note 130.
168 See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1183 (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("'If the Congress had intended to grant a preference ... it would certainly not have
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"[t]he term 'reasonable accommodation' may include . . .reassign-
ment to a vacant position,"' 69 which is distinguishable from "shall in-
clude reassignment." 170  According to critics of mandatory
reassignment, a sensible reading of the text is that the employer must
consider the feasibility of assigning the disabled employee to a differ-
ent position, but the employer does not have to award him or her the
job.171 Such an interpretation prevents employers from establishing
blanket bans on reassignments, 172 and it prevents employers from
deeming a disabled employee less qualified for a vacant position on
the basis of his or her disability.' 73
b. Legislative History
Critics of mandatory reassignment argue that Congress designed
the ADA to provide equality, not special preferences, for disabled
Americans. Congress enacted the ADA pursuant to a finding that dis-
ability discrimination "denies people with disabilities the opportunity
to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for
which our free society is justifiably famous."'1 74 Furthermore, Con-
gress intended the ADA to complement existing federal and state laws
encouraging employers to consider all persons on their merits. 175 Ac-
cording to the critics, to require employers to fill vacant positions with
less-qualified individuals solely because of their disabilities would un-
dermine the objective of considering all persons on their merits. 176
Circuit courts that have rejected mandatory reassignment have ac-
knowledged that the EEOC guidance appears to require reassign-
ment,177 but these circuits also contend that courts need not afford
deference to the guidelines, particularly where the guidelines appear
to conflict with the text or policy aims of the ADA. 178
done so by slipping the phrase "reassignment to a vacant position" in the middle of this list
of reasonable accommodations."' (quoting Aka, 156 F.3d at 1314-15 (Silberman, J.,
dissenting))).
169 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000).
170 Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1184 ("[T]he phrase 'may include reassignment to a
vacant position' cannot mean 'shall include reassignment to a vacant position."').
171 See EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d. 1024, 1027-28 (7th Cir. 2000).
172 See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1184 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 58 (1990),
as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 340).
173 See id.
174 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 2(a)(9) (emphasis added).
175 See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1181.
176 See id. at 1181-83 (discussing the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits' rationales
for finding that reassignment of disabled employees is not required under the ADA).
177 See supra note 153.
178 See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1184; see also Wal-Mart's Brief in Opposition at 11,
Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 742 (No. 07-480) (2007), cert. dismissed, 128 S. Ct.
1116 (2008) (arguing that Auerv. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997), holds that deference is
appropriate only when the language of the regulation or statute is ambiguous).
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c. Policy
A strong argument against mandatory reassignment is that it
would convert the ADA-a nondiscrimination statute-into a
mandatory preference statute. 179 Circuit courts that reject mandatory
reassignment contend that awarding the job to the best applicant is
always nondiscriminatory, 180 whereas mandatory reassignment gives
"bonus points" to people with disabilities, in a way similar to the oper-
ation of veterans' preference statutes. 18 1 These circuits argue that the
ADA should require employers to eliminate obstacles to hiring the
best applicant for a job, but to require employers to hire inferior ap-
plicants because they are disabled misses the mark and is "affirmative
action with a vengeance."''
82
C. U.S. Supreme Court Missed an Opportunity to Resolve the
Split
The U.S. Supreme Court nearly had an opportunity to resolve the
circuit split regarding mandatory reassignment under the ADA. On
December 7, 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Huber
case, limited to the following question:
If a disability prevents an employee from performing the essential
functions of his or her current position, does the ADA require:
(a) that the employer reassign the employee to a vacant, equivalent
position for which he or she is qualified, as the Tenth and District of
Columbia Circuits have held; or
(b) that the employer merely permit the employee to apply and
compete with other applicants for the vacant, equivalent position
for which he or she is qualified, as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits
have held? 183
Presumably, the Supreme Court agreed with Huber that the circuits
are in conflict regarding mandatory reassignment.1
84
Unfortunately for those interested in seeing the circuit split re-
solved, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari in mid-Jan-
uary 2008.185 The Court dismissed the writ pursuant to Supreme
179 See EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (7th Cir. 2000).
180 See id. at 1028.
181 See id. at 1027.
182 See id. at 1028-29.
183 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Huber, 128 S. Ct. 742 (No. 07-480): see also
Huber, 128 S. Ct. 742 (granting certiorari on the first question presented by the petition).
184 See Reply to Brief in Opposition at 1, Huber, 128 S. Ct. 742 (No. 07-480) (arguing
that only Wal-Mart denies the existence of a circuit split).
185 See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1116, 1116 (2008).
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Court Rule 46,186 apparently after Huber and Wal-Mart agreed to set-
dle the dispute. 187 Thus, the circuit split continues.
D. Impact of the Continuing Circuit Split
1. Negative Repercussions for the Business Community
As with any circuit split, disagreement over the ADA's reassign-
ment provision has created uncertainty in the business environment.
In the economic analysis of law, consistency is a "touchstone of ration-
ality"-the idealized "rational agent" needs uniformity to properly or-
der personal and business affairs. 188 Legal uncertainty prevents
business owners, employers, employees, and their lawyers from mak-
ing fully informed decisions. 18 9
The existing ADA circuit split has created an additional prob-
lem-it has encouraged businesses to adopt inconsistent reassignment
policies. A company that operates in multiple states spanning differ-
ent circuits faces a difficult situation. In those jurisdictions that do
not require reassignment, the company may adhere to its wholly
merit-based employment policy and not reassign a less-qualified dis-
abled employee. The same company, however, must reassign disabled
employees in those circuits where reassignment is mandatory. This
inconsistency presumably reduces the morale of disabled employees
in circuits where reassignment is not required because those disabled
employees have a comparatively more difficult time retaining their
jobs. It may also create unnecessary confusion and encourage forum
shopping or vigorous jurisdiction-based legal battles. 190 Of course, a
186 See id.; see also Sup. CT. R. 46(1) ("At any stage of the proceedings, whenever all
parties file with the Clerk an agreement in writing that a case be dismissed, specifying the
terms for payment of costs, and pay to the Clerk any fees then due, the Clerk, without
further reference to the Court, will enter an order of dismissal.").
187 See Settlement in Wal-Mart Suit, supra note 9. As a result, courts in the Eighth Circuit
continue to allow merit-based policies to trump reassignment obligations under the ADA.
See, e.g., Willnerd v. First Nat'l of Neb., Inc., No. 8:05CV482, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69837,
at *36-38 (D. Neb. Sept. 19, 2007) ("In light of the recent decision in Huber, th[is] court
finds that [the employer] had no duty to accommodate plaintiff by automatically awarding
him a position for which he met the minimum requirements.").
188 Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1153,
1162-63 (2002) (describing the idealized rational agent as preferring a coherent ordering
of possible states of affairs and avoiding normative evaluations of the agent's own beliefs or
choices).
189 Cf J. Richard Broughton, Note, "Business Curtilage" and the Fourth Amendment: Recon-
ciling Katz with the Common Law, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 513, 543 (1998) (recognizing that
inconsistent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the area of "business curtilage" creates
instability and uncertainty for business owners, employees, lawyers, and law enforcement
officials).
190 For businesses operating in multiple jurisdictions, forum shopping might become a
major concern. A multi-jurisdictional business like Wal-Mart could be susceptible to suit
where the alleged incident occurred, where the disabled individual resides, or where the
company has its corporate headquarters. With different rules in different circuits, litigants
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business could avoid such inconsistent results by embracing
mandatory reassignment nationwide, but that choice may reduce mo-
rale of non-disabled employees who believe their employer awards
"bonus points" to their disabled colleagues. 19 1
2. Negative Repercussions for the Disabled
Clearly, disabled persons that work in jurisdictions where reas-
signment is not mandatory may ultimately find themselves unem-
ployed. Disabled persons in those jurisdictions may also have
different employment-related rights than disabled persons in other ju-
risdictions simply because of their physical location. 19 2 Less obvious,
however, is how rejecting mandatory reassignment harms the disabil-
ity-rights movement. When deciding issues of disability law, the ana-
lytical framework employed by courts fundamentally defines what
equality means for people with disabilities. 193
To reject mandatory reassignment because it would constitute
"affirmative action" or special treatment is to embrace the medical-
rehabilitative model of disability. 19 4  When a court holds that
mandatory reassignment constitutes special treatment, the court im-
plicitly says that the accommodation itself is "special. 1 9 5 The accom-
modation is "'special' precisely because there is something 'wrong'
with the disabled person that makes her unable to interact 'normally'
with the environment."' 19 6 A court can see the accommodation as
"special" only if the court conceives of the original way in which the
job is structured as "natural" and the accommodation as something
more than simply a way to dismantle employment discrimination. 9 7
A court that views accommodation as "special" embraces the medical-
will have a great incentive to litigate over the suit's proper location, making it even more
difficult for a business to order its affairs with certainty or predict its exposure to liability.
191 EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 2000).
192 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 128 S. Ct.
742 (2007) (No. 07-480), cert. dismissed, 128 S. Ct. 1116 (2008) ("An employee with a disa-
bility in Kansas City, Missouri, has lesser rights under the ADA than an employee with a
disability in Kansas City, Kansas. That state of affairs intolerably undermines Congress's
express purpose 'to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimina-
tion of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."' (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(b) (1) (2000) (emphasis added)).
193 See Rovner, supra note 1, at 1045-46. For example, disabilities scholar Lennard
Davis found that use of the term "special" in disability rights cases invokes an image of the
disabled plaintiff as self-centered and narcissistic, reducing chances at recovery. See id. at
1077 (citing LennardJ. Davis, Bending Over Backwards: Disability, Narcissism, and the Law, 21
BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 193, 196-98 (2000)).
194 For a discussion of the medical-rehabilitative model, see supra Part I.B.1.
195 See Rovner, supra noLe 1, at 1076.
196 Id.
197 See id. (quoting Jennifer Lav, Conceptualizations of Disability and the Constitutionality of
Remedial Schemes Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 197,
226 (2002)).
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rehabilitative model of disability because it locates the "problem" of
disability in the disabled person rather than in the disabling
environment. 198
Judicial adoption of the medical-rehabilitative model dis-
empowers the disability-rights movement. In handing down disability-
related holdings, courts make implicit judgments about the dis-
abled. 99 Such judgments impact the disability movement because the
movement looks to the law to assist in political self-definition.2 1111 More
specifically, judicial dialogue informs the politics, vision, and demands
of the disability movement.20 1 Like other identity-based social move-
ments of the late twentieth century-including the movements for wo-
men's liberation and gay rights-the disabled population needs the
judiciary to properly understand the legal and societal challenges it
faces before the movement can expect to achieve sustainable societal
change. 20 2
III
A SOCIO-POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING OF DISAmLIrY
MANDATES REASSIGNMENT
The circuit split regarding mandatory reassignment has gener-
ated much debate about the text, legislative history, and policy behind
the ADA. 20 3 Yet no circuit court has discussed how the different disa-
bility models impact that debate. Through a socio-political under-
standing of disability, one begins to recognize both that our social
institutions were not built neutrally20 4 and that mandatory reassign-
ment is an appropriate response to such inequality.
A. The Primacy of the Socio-Political Model
The socio-political model of disability properly traces the major
problems faced by disabled persons to the restraints imposed by the
disabling environment.20 5 For many individuals with physical, mobil-
ity-related impairments, the primary barrier to full societal participa-
tion stems from architectural barriers-buildings without elevators,
198 See id.
199 See id. at 1045.
200 See id. at 1046.
201 See id.
202 Cf id. at 1081-82 (discussing Professor William Eskridge's theory that for the iden-
tity-based social movements of the late-twentieth century, legal rules and institutions were
necessary elements of three preconditions--definition of a class, forums to object, and
events triggering community mobilization).
203 See generally supra Part I.B.
204 See Rovner, supra note 1, at 1062 (noting that societal structures and institutions
created by the nondisabled majority often do not account for the variety of human needs).
205 See Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or Biased Reasoning,
21 BERKELEY . EMP. & LAB. L. 166, 173 (2000).
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narrow paths that cannot accommodate mobility equipment, etc.; like-
wise, communicative barriers continue to restrain individuals with sen-
sory impairments. 20 6 Such impairments would largely disappear in a
world adapted to the needs of all its inhabitants. 20 7 Today's "disability
problem" is not that some individuals have personal "defects"; rather,
the problem is that our present environment was "'designed for the
average human being, plus or minus half a standard deviation.'1
208
Only the socio-political model recognizes these realities.
Moreover, the socio-political model is consistent with contempo-
rary understandings of race and gender because it challenges the as-
sumption that "biology is destiny."20 9 Like the race and gender
theories that preceded it, the socio-political model contends that the
disadvantages the disabled population faces, like those suffered by Af-
rican-Americans and women, are the product of social forces.
210
Throughout history, the majority has used bodily traits-skin color,
sex, disability-as the bases for differentiating and discriminating
against minorities. 21' "In the case of people with disabilities, bigotry
or bias is evoked either by visible bodily differences or by stigmatized
labels attached to physiological attributes. '" 2 12 This social understand-
ing means that the socio-political model offers a better chance of
crafting solutions to eliminate biases against the disabled population.
Further, the socio-political model of disability correctly recog-
nizes that the disabled population cannot fully participate in society as
a self-fulfilling prophecy.2 13 The problem is that mainstream media
portrays disabled people as either "helpless cripples" or "courageous
overcomers." 2 14 Such presentations then operate at a subtextual level
to denigrate the disabled population, fostering unexamined and hos-
tile-or ignorant-attitudes toward disabled people that ultimately re-
sult in negligently or hostilely built environments. 2 15 Such negative
attitudes also support, at least implicitly, a social and legal system that
excludes the disabled population. 2 1
6
206 See id.
207 See id.
208 See Harlan Hahn, Reconceptualizing Disability: A Political Science Perspective, 45 REHABIL-
ITATION LITERATURE 362, 364 (1984) (quoting an unspecified "noted urban planner").
209 SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY: KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTiTy 143 (1998).
210 See Rovner, supra note 1, at 1051-52.
211 See Hahn, supra note 205, at 174.
212 Id.
213 See Rovner, supra note 1, at 1052.
214 See id. at 1053.
215 See id. at 1054. Disabled people often express the opinion that the single greatest
obstacle they face is attitudes. See Hahn, supra note 205, at 175; see also Cook, supra note 66,
at 35.
216 See Hahn, supra note 205, at 174-75. As a result, "[d]isabled persons often find
themselves trapped in an 'approved disabled role' and find that their behavior becomes
organized around this role.... Their major concern may become 'acceptance' and it is
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Finally, the socio-political model of disability, unlike the medical-
rehabilitative model, is politically transformative because it empowers
the disability-rights movement. For over forty years, the disability-
rights movement has tried to reframe the way people think about indi-
viduals with disabilities. 21 7 The medical-rehabilitative model locates
the problem within the individual, perpetuating notions of incapacity
and dependence that trigger social and economic isolation. 21 8 By re-
jecting the idea that individuals with disabilities suffer from personal
defects, the disability movement has been able to promote changes to
the physical and social environment while dodging attacks of "special
treatment."21 9 Judicial embrace of the medical-rehabilitative model
represents backsliding. 220
B. A Socio-Political Model Underlies the ADA
The ADA was watershed legislation because it adopted many of
the tenets of the socio-political model of disability.2 21 For example,
the ADA's findings demonstrate that the "disability problem" resides
in the external environment, not within disabled individuals. First,
Congress used the ADA to describe individuals with disabilities as
members of a discrete and insular minority:
[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority
who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position
of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics
that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from
stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability
of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society. 222
not surprising that disabled individuals attempt to 'pass as normal' if their handicap is not
too severe." Cook, supra note 66, at 35.
217 See Rovner, supra note 1, at 1043.
218 See id. (quoting Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 21 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 219 (2000)).
219 Cf id. at 1049. ("By starting from the premise that the 'problem' of disability is an
inherent physical flaw, any attempts to require changes in the environment to account for
such 'flaws' were necessarily viewed as 'special treatment' .... .. ). Today, power is not a
stable and steady force; who can wield power depends, at least in part, on the way in which
we as a society view the interrelationships amongst people. Cf ROLAND BLEIKER, POPULAR
DISSENT, HUMAN AGENCY AND GLOBAL POLITICS 135-36 (2000). The socio-political model,
by isolating the source of the "disability problem" in the external environment, creates a
new way of thinking about how disabled persons should be able to interact with the rest of
society. If the socio-political model is successful, people will begin to address the disability
problem by examining external physical and communicative barriers rather than the "de-
fects" of disabled individuals themselves.
220 See Rovner, supra note 1, at 1046.
221 See id. at 1044.
222 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 2(a) (7), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (7) (2000).
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The "constitutional code words" of "discrete and insular minority"
have historically been used to identify a group that has faced externally
imposed obstacles in public and private life. 223 Second, like the socio-
political model, the ADA findings declare that the primary obstacles
to the disabled achieving full participation in society include the dis-
crimination imposed by architectural, transportation, and communi-
cative barriers, along with the failure to modify facilities.22 4
In addition, the reasonable accommodations provision itself re-
flects a socio-political understanding of disability. First, the provision
demonstrates Congress's understanding that people with disabilities
cannot fully participate in society until public and private entities
modify the physical environment. 225 The problem of disability is not
located in the person who must use a wheelchair for mobility; instead,
it is located in societal structures that exclude the disabled through
narrow doorways and entrances without ramps.226 Second, the ADA
reasonable accommodations provision mandates reform; it properly
recognizes that combating systematic exclusion requires society to
restructure the environment. 227
Additionally, the ADA appears to have adopted the tenets of the
socio-political model when it defined "disability." The ADA defines
disability in terms of identity: "The term 'disability' means, with re-
spect to an individual-(A) a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being re-
garded as having such an impairment. '" 228 Of particular import is part
C, which recognizes disability status for an individual simply if others
perceive him or her as having a disability.229 For example, if an em-
ployer believes an employee has recently become disabled and conse-
223 See Rovner, supra note 1, at 1061.
224 See id.; see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 2(a) (5) ("[I] ndividuals with
disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright in-
tentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and commu-
nication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to
existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, segrega-
tion, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other
opportunities.").
225 See Rovner, supra note 1, at 1063. By including the reasonable accommodations
provision in the text of the ADA, congressional drafters "'sought to transform the institu-
tion of disability by locating responsibility for disablement not only in a disabled person's
impairment, but also in "disabling" physical or structural environments."' Id. at 1064
(quoting Linda Hamilton Krieger, Aflerword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 476, 481 (2000)).
226 See id. at 1063-64 (stating that the problem partially results from the fact that soci-
ety has built many of its institutions without "a range of needs. and abiliti-es in n-ii-d").
227 See id. at 1064.
228 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 3(2).
229 See id.; Kaplan, supra note 15, at 358. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's ADA Title I technical assistance manual provides further clarification:
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quently fires the employee, the employer would be discriminating
under the ADA even if the employee had not, in fact, become dis-
abled. 230 Such a result is only possible because the ADA, like the
socio-political model, recognizes that societal attitudes toward those
identified as "disabled" form the basis for discrimination. 23'
Finally, the ADA was a policy commitment to the social inclusion
of people with disabilities. The ADA was the product of years of
proactive efforts by persons with disabilities, the disability-rights move-
ment, legislators, and other visionaries. 232 Disability advocates pur-
posefully chose some of the methods and approaches of the African-
American civil-rights movement to secure legal guarantees of equal-
ity.23 3 Legislators recognized the goal of social equality in their early
reports that lay the groundwork for the ADA:
[Preceding] handicap nondiscrimination laws fail to serve the cen-
tral purpose of any human rights law-providing a strong statement
of a societal imperative. An adequate equal opportunity law for per-
sons with disabilities will seek to obtain the voluntary compliance of
the great majority of law-abiding citizens by notifying them that dis-
crimination against persons with disabilities will no longer be toler-
ated by our society.2 34
As discussed above, societal integration is a primary goal of the socio-
political model.
C. A Socio-Political Understanding Mandates Reassignment
Critics of mandatory reassignment are correct when they say Con-
gress did not intend the ADA to be an affirmative action program for
employees with disabilities. 23 5 Affirmative action is a transitional pol-
icy designed to eliminate the effects of past prejudice.2 36 Yet the ADA
The individual may have an impairment which is not substantially limiting,
but is treated by the employer as having such an impairment. For example. An
employee has controlled high blood pressure which does not substantially
limit his work activities. If an employer reassigns the individual to a less
strenuous job because of unsubstantiated fear that the person would suffer
a heart attack if he continues in the present job, the employer has 're-
garded' this person as disabled.
EEOC, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE 1) OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT § 2.2(c) (1992).
230 See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 358-59.
231 See id.
232 SeeJANE WEST, Introduction-Implementing the Act: Where We Begin, in THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT: FROM POLICY TO PRACTICE, at xi, xi-xii Uane West ed., 1991).
233 See Rovner, supra note 1, at 1059.
234 Scotch, supra note 218, at 216 (quoting NAT'L COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, supra
note 54, at 18).
235 See, e.g., Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 397-98 (E.D. Tex.
1995).
236 See generally Thomas Sowell, Weber and Bakke and the Presumptions of "Affirmative
Action," 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1309, 1310-11 (1980) (arguing that affirmative action has
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does require affirmative steps to eliminate barriers to full societal par-
ticipation. Why? Because the problems faced by the disabled popula-
tion are different from those faced by other marginalized groups, the
remedy must be different too. In the context of race, a nondiscrimi-
nation statute that bans the consideration of race in employment deci-
sions may be relatively effective at combating race discrimination. 237
But the same statute cannot protect the disabled population-an em-
ployer who treats disabled employees exactly the same as non-disabled
employees may still-at least implicitly-privilege non-disabled
employees. 238
Employers may provide unfair advantages to non-disabled em-
ployees because existing societal institutions and the physical environ-
ment constrain opportunities for the disabled.2 39 Under a socio-
political understanding of disability, many employment environments
exhibit the same biases as other physical environments. To use an
earlier example, the problem is not that the employee in a wheelchair
is unwilling to attend a corporate meeting; instead, the problem is
that the meeting is held in a building without an elevator. The solu-
tion is not to change the disabled employee; rather, the solution is to
reshape the environment. In the employment context, reshaping the
environment means requiring employers to make reasonable accom-
modations-including, as a last resort, reassignment-that allow dis-
abled individuals to compete alongside others in the workplace. 240
evolved from the original idea of "cease and desist" to now require affirmative mitigation
of past discrimination).
237 See Riel v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 681 (5th Cir. 1996); see also McAlindin
v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1237 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The essence of the concept
of reasonable accommodation is that, in certain instances, employers must make special
adjustments to their policies for individuals with disabilities.").
238 See McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1237. Arlene Mayerson, one of the drafters of the ADA,
offers her perspective, noting:
As drafters of the ADA... we incorporated nondiscrimination provisions
from section 504 implementing regulations that assured that different treat-
ment would be provided when necessary to achieve equal opportunity. We
were insistent that reasonable accommodation was not affirmative action
but simply part and parcel of meaningful nondiscrimination. Unlike the
women's movement, which has been hotly debating the wisdom of ever
veering from the equal treatment paradigm, the disability movement has
known from the outset that for people with disabilities, a civil rights statute
based solely on equal treatment would fall far short of achieving the goals
of inclusion and participation.
In other words, we conceptualized equal protection as equal opportu-
nity, which by necessity required affirmative steps to eliminate barriers to
participation.
Arlene B. Mayerson & Silvia Yee, The ADA and Models of Equality, 62 OHIo ST. L.J. 535,
536-37 (2001) (citations omitted).
239 See Rovner, supra note 1, at 1062.
240 See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397-98 (2002).
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Only mandatory reassignment reshapes the employment environ-
ment. By analogy, a "wholly merit-based" reassignment policy like the
one at Wal-Mart assumes that the disabled population may fairly com-
pete in the "employment race" so long as all contestants are evenly
lined up at the starting line. 24 1 Yet such an understanding ignores the
environmental obstacles faced by the disabled community. 24 2 For
many disabled people, the racetrack is already littered with obstacles
like physical inaccessibility, communicative barriers, stigma, and dis-
criminatory attitudes. 243 To ensure a fair race, society must force em-
ployers to clear the track, and if employers cannot clear the track, they
should reassign the disabled contestants to an equivalent, but clear,
track. Mandatory reassignment puts disabled employees on truly
equal footing with non-disabled employees.
CONCLUSION
By granting certiorari, 244 the Supreme Court acknowledged the
circuit split over mandatory reassignment.245 Though the parties in
Huber v. Wal-Mart246 settled, preventing immediate Supreme Court
resolution, the Court will likely have another opportunity to deter-
mine whether an employer must reassign a disabled, qualified em-
ployee to a vacant, equivalent position. By exacerbating legal and
business uncertainties, creating inconsistent legal rights for disabled
Americans, and directly impacting the political framework of the disa-
bility-rights movement, the circuit split has assuredly created an incen-
tive for various parties to litigate this issue in the future. Thus, the
remaining question is: how will the Supreme Court-or a previously
"silent" circuit court-resolve the issue in the future?
This Note demonstrates that courts should use a socio-political
model of disability to interpret the ADA. Disability law advanced from
its early roots in local charity to a system of rehabilitation for war vet-
erans. The ADA represents the most recent shift in disability law to a
socio-political model that recognizes that the disability "problem" re-
sides not in the disabled individual, but in societal institutions and
environments designed only for the "average person plus or minus
half a standard deviation."247 By recognizing physical and communi-
241 See Hahn, supra note 205, at 189 n.120.
242 See id.
243 See id.
244 See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 742 (2007), cert. dismissed, 128 S. Ct.
1116 (2008).
245 See Reply to Brief in Opposition at 1, Huber, 128 S. Ct. 742 (No. 07-480) (arguing
that only Wal-Mart denies the existence of a circuit split).
246 See Huber, 128 S. Ct. 1116 (2008); Settlement in Wal-Mart Suit, supra note 9.
247 Hahn, supra note 208, at 364.
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cative barriers, the socio-political model offers the best hope for social
and economic integration of the disabled.
A socio-political understanding of disability requires an employer
to reassign a disabled employee to a vacant, equivalent position when
no other accommodation is reasonable. Voluntary reassignment poli-
cies like the one used by Wal-Mart, even under the mantra of "mer-
itocracy," disguise the environmental obstacles that preclude full and
fair economic participation by the disabled population. Requiring
employers to make reasonable accommodations, including reassign-
ments, is not "affirmative action" to employ disabled individuals be-
cause of their class status; rather, it is an embodiment of the idea that
society cannot challenge environmental and attitudinal discrimina-
tion in the same ways it countered biases against other marginalized
groups. The ADA was watershed in its recognition that only affirma-
tive steps to eliminate discrimination will allow individuals with disa-
bilities to experience meaningful societal participation. Courts
should follow the ADA's lead and embrace a socio-political model of
disability by requiring reassignment.
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